European technological sovereignty

The “power to be able”

Far from the negative connotation with which it is frequently attributed in France, associated with nationalism or protectionism, sovereignty must be considered in its primary sense, that of the “power to be able”. The digital transformation affects the exercise of sovereignty in several dimensions: the economy, nutrition, health, culture, education, defence, security… Thus, the digital field must be considered as a new strategic dimension, open to technological developments and through which the expression of state sovereignty must pass through and materialise. Consequently, this dimension should be considered alongside the terrestrial, maritime, airspace and outer-space dimensions of sovereignty. What is more, its command also allows for states to confirm their sovereignty in these other dimensions.

The current state of the debate on the legal structure of the European Union is not conducive to the legal establishment of European sovereignty. However, it is already a tangible geopolitical and democratic issue that reflects its Member States’ sovereignty challenges.

“Technological sovereignty” rather than “digital sovereignty”

The question at the heart of the topic is that of the strategic dependence of the European Union when it comes to digital technologies. Yet, without technological expertise, there can be no strategic autonomy in the digital field. Mastering the strategic dimension of digital technologies is not only a matter of this technological field. It more widely encompasses a certain number of other technologies. Ranging from the raw materials needed to manufacture electronic chips, to the exploitation of digital services’ usage data, these layers include a diversity of material strata and digital services. Some of these layers are prerequisites for guaranteeing sovereignty, and for each of them there is a critical threshold below which technological sovereignty is not ensured.

The Covid-19 crisis revealed the essential nature of certain digital tools and services, in addition to revealing the strategic dependence Europeans face in this regard. The crisis put forward the need to not be dependent on an extra-european “technological tap” for critical technologies, in other words, to avoid the danger of suddenly and abruptly being cut off from access to essential technologies for the economy and European society.

The subsidiarity principle must prevail

For investment capacity reasons, technological sovereignty can only be achieved at the European level. Historically, the technological sovereignty objective has called for massive investments to master entire technological chains (cf. weapons, nuclear, space). In this respect, the semiconductor market is a telling example. This market consists of a highly concentrated industry with massive capital, requiring decades of investment to produce the latest generation of products. In the upcoming months, the United States will, for instance, allocate 52 billion dollars to subsidise the construction of state-of-the-art microchip factories in the country¹.

In terms of digital technology, the European Union must be considered here as a way to leverage power for the Member States while the principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in EU law, must prevail. The Union has long lived in denial about questions of power. In fact, some Member State governments are opposed to the existence of a strong European Union. However, if Member States wish to ensure their technological sovereignty, they need to be in favour of a strong Union in the sector. This principle does not negate their national sovereignty. On the contrary, it allows its strengthening thanks to collective means.

Rethinking the “public/private” relationship strategically

The United States has developed a strategic approach to the economy, most evident in the Clinton era “Information Superhighway” project, as well as in the digital adaptation of the 1974 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) which, in its national sovereignty definition, includes economic power interests in the service of national power, particularly in regards to international relations. This economic conception of American national security, in place for more than half a century, has translated into the emergence of public-private interest convergences. With different political cultures and approaches, China and Russia have also decided, over the last fifteen years, to instrumentalise the development framework of their economic and strategic hosts, resorting to a very controlled approach in line with strategic interests and technological power.

In Europe, the conception of the role of public action in the service of strategic stakes has very often been confined to the concept of a “strategic State”, tasked with the role of a provider of public funds or a regulator of excessive economic power within the internal market. It was not until the first speeches by Thierry Breton, European Commissioner for the Internal Market, and the impetus of the Digital Compass for 2030 (PDF) programme that a political vision of a European technological sector power deficit in the 21st century materialised starting in 2019. The global pandemic provided this impulse with ideological consolidation and expansion.

Nevertheless, the EU, like the majority of its Member States, has not yet freed itself from the administrative and legal conceptions confined to the role of a public power, mixing a rigid conception of what the State is supposed to do, with a certain defiance in regards to being an economic power. These cultural reflexes still put on the brakes to the advent of a partner conception of European power, one which necessarily mixes interests from public and private actors. The European Union must start to conceive its economic, legal and administrative competences through a strategic lens, and it must also corroborate the independence of its regulators by affirming its transversal strategic objectives.

¹ Eurasia Group, “EU/Geo-technology: Semiconductor push will cost billions, take years, and still not deliver self-sufficiency”, 4 November 2021

WORKING GROUP