Consultation “Digital Fitness Check”: Our response

Simplify Yes, Deregulate No

Simplifying the EU’s digital regulatory framework is a legitimate and necessary goal. However, simplification must not be confused with deregulation. The European Union’s regulatory architecture represents a global model, protecting European citizens and consumers more effectively than anywhere else in the world. Rolling back these protections¹ risks undermining not only users’ trust, but also Europe’s regulatory credibility and soft power in global digital governance. The EU institutions – supported by Member States – should also better « marketize » its Digital Rulebook to citizens, whose knowledge about their online rights and how to use them properly is too often fragmented. Therefore, instead of focusing most of its regulatory simplification narrative on companies, the European Commission could lead by example and make the existing – and hopefully soon to be improved– EU digital acquis more visible and tangible to European citizens.

Besides, the DSA and the DMA remain two cornerstones of this EU digital acquis. Despite being relatively recent regulations, they have laid the foundations of a new « EU model » that prioritizes accountability, transparency and fairness in the platform economy. The focus today should not be on reopening or weakening these frameworks, but rather on guaranteeing their full and consistent implementation across Member States, since they would need time and stability before reaching cruising speed and – ultimately – achieving the objectives they were meant for.

Moreover, Renaissance Numérique supports a systematic assessment of the cumulative costs and impacts of the digital acquis for different categories of actors – including SMEs – not as a pretext for lowering standards, but to identify overlaps, unnecessary administrative burdens and opportunities for mutual recognition of compliance efforts across instruments. Without such evidence, the narrative that EU regulation is inherently anti‑competitive will remain difficult to counter.

Finally, Europe’s normative power — sometimes described as the « Brussels Effect » — derives from its ability to shape global standards through regulation grounded in democratic values. Succumbing to narratives that frame regulation as an obstacle to innovation³ or geopolitical competitiveness would be a strategic error. Instead, Europe should double down on what makes its model distinctive : rights-based digital governance that reconciles technological progress with human dignity, market fairness, and the public interest. This also requires revising the governance model of the EU Digital Rulebook.

Improving the Governance of the EU Digital Rulebook

Beyond the question of coherence, the Digital Fitness Check should examine how governance mechanisms can evolve to make digital regulation more inclusive, responsive and evidence-based⁴.

In this respect, we strongly support the interregulation approach, which emphasizes enhanced coordination among institutional, national, and civil-society actors. As argued in multiple Renaissance Numérique’s policy papers⁵⁶, the EU’s digital governance will be more effective if it relies on the expertise and legitimacy of a broad community of stakeholders — including national regulators, consumer and human rights organizations, research institutions⁷, and technical communities. Indeed, the EU’s digital rulebook now resembles a regulatory millefeuille, where successive layers of sector-specific texts have been added without a genuine overarching vision or clear arbitration between norms and regulators. This produces a legal environment that is both highly complex and fragmented, fuelling conflicts of competence between authorities and making enforcement harder. Instead of adding yet another sectoral layer, we call for horizontal procedural and coordination instruments to ensure coherence across regimes and to organise how different regulators work together. This effort should be closely coordinated with Member States’ authorities in full compliance with the subsidiarity principle.

Beyond high‑level coordination, the Digital Fitness Check should address the very practical obstacles that currently prevent regulators from working together efficiently. Our recent work⁸ has identified the need to harmonise basic investigative procedures and to facilitate the re‑use of evidence and information gathered by one authority in the proceedings of another (for instance between data protection, consumer protection, competition and media regulators). This would enable more joint investigations, reduce duplication of efforts, and strengthen legal certainty for both companies and users, without creating a single « super‑regulator ». More specifically, we recommend that the European Commission develop common guidelines on key digital regulatory concepts – such as dark patterns (in the context of the upcoming Digital Fairness Act⁹), profiling, and risk assessment – that apply consistently across the GDPR, the DSA, consumer protection law, the AI Act, and related instruments. This would align with the EU’s own « Better Regulation » and « consistent interpretation » objectives, and with calls from bodies like the EDPB and the Commission itself for coherent enforcement in the digital sphere.

To make this operational, these guidelines should be backed by joint action plans between competent authorities (for example, coordinated inspections, joint investigations, and shared hearings of major platforms), drawing inspiration from French practice, where formal cooperation agreements between regulators (such as CNIL–DGCCRF or Arcom–VIGINUM) structure information-sharing and coordinated enforcement.

Establishing formal cooperation structures between European and national authorities — and allocating (or strongly incentivising) sufficient financial and human resources to them — is therefore essential. Such a model would also strengthen democratic accountability by ensuring that regulatory processes remain transparent and « grass-rooted », as many NRAs are deeply connected to the EU tech ecosystem.

Finally, a renewed dialogue between EU institutions, Member States, and civil society is needed to monitor the real-world impact of digital regulations in the future. Progress indicators should not focus exclusively on market outcomes and competitiveness, but also on users’ empowerment, algorithmic accountability, environmental sustainability, and accessibility for all citizens.

¹ See the concerns expressed by the EDPB and EDPS in their joint contribution to the Digital Omnibus proposal, especially on changing the scope of art. 4 GDPR. See also the contributions from privacy defenders, such as NOYB’s on the same matter.
²See ITRE committee’s study on Interplay between the AI Act and the EU digital legislative framework (2025).
³See OECD’s Recommendation of the Council for Agile Regulatory Governance to Harness Innovation (2021), CEPS’ Special Report « Does EU regulation hinder or stimulate innovation? » by Jacques Pelkmans and Andrea Renda (2014), as well as the flourishing literature from multiple National Regulatory Agencies (NRA), for instance in the telecom sector.
⁴As rightly mentioned in SWD(2025) 836 final (point 1.2.2).
⁵EU Digital Policy: the Time Has Come to Connect the Dots (2024).
⁶For an Effective Interregulation in the Digital Sphere (2025).
⁷To this end, the approach developed in art. 40 of the DSA could be extended to other relevant digital legislations – or even the EU digital acquis as a whole – as a means to better leverage independent research-action to the benefit of regulation.
⁸Renaissance Numérique 2024 & 2025.
⁹On the DFA, specific attention should be given to aligning policy objectives with existing laws (e.g. GDPR’s approach to data minimization) in order to prevent inconsistencies.
¹⁰Regarding the DMA High-level Group, CERRE has already formulated some proposals that would be worth experimenting.
¹¹See Renaissance Numérique’s report AI Governance: Empowering Civil Society (2025).